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INTRODUCTION

One View of the Cathedral is famous in part because Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed noticed a missing category in the ways that courts resolved
nuisance disputes.' Consider the classic-if somewhat idealized-nuisance
dispute between a single "Polluter" and a single "Resident" who is discomforted
by the pollution. Courts had traditionally chosen among three different
outcomes:
Rule 1: a court might issue an injunction against a Polluter;
Rule 2: a court might find a nuisance but permit pollution to
continue if the Polluter chose to pay damages; or
Rule 3: a court might find the pollution not to be a nuisance and
permit the Polluter to continue without paying damages.

But Calabresi and Melamed, by appreciating the difference between liability and
property rules, saw that these three approaches naturally fit into a two-by-two
box.
Table 1. Calabresi and Melamed's Two-by-Two Box with the Missing Category

Method of
Protection
Property
Liability
Rule
Rule

Entitlement

Resident
Polluter

Rule 1
Rule 3

Rule 2
[Rule 4]

The problem with the traditional three-way approach was that one of the
boxes was empty.
Calabresi and Melamed's theory suggested a fourth
approach:

1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, iability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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Rule 4: a court might permit a Polluter to continue unless the
Resident chose to pay the Polluter damages in order to
enjoin further pollution.
As fate would have it, the fourth box would not stay empty for long. In Spur
Industries v. Del Webb, Justice James D. Cameron of the Arizona Supreme
Court-in what has probably become the most cited "coming to the nuisance"
decision-found that pollution could be enjoined but that the a developer

representing residents had to "indemnify [the Polluter] for a reasonable amount
of the cost of moving or shutting down."2 Just as Einstein's reputation grew
when he was able to predict that gravity could bend light just before a natural
experiment dramatically proved his claim, 3 Calabresi and Melamed's good
fortune in identifying a vacuum that was almost simultaneously filled helped
solidify their article's well deserved fame.
This narrative is well known by the vast majority of tort (and property)
professors. 4 However, the legal academy seems to be much less aware of an
analogous phenomenon that has been developing over the last five years.

Starting in 1993 with Madeline Morris's article, The Structure of Entitlements,5

a group of about a half dozen scholars have started to see "liability rule"
protection as a type of call option.6 Just as the property/liability rule distinction

2. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (Cameron,
V.C.J.). The court's unconditional order seems different than the definition of Rule 4 in the text
which gives the Resident the choice of whether (a) to pay to stop further pollution or (b) not to pay
and to allow the Polluter to continue polluting. To harmonize the case with the definition, it is
necessary to speculate what would have happened if Del Webb had petitioned the court to void its
order enjoining the pollution as well as its order that Del Webb indemnify Spur. If we believe that
the court would have in effect allowed Del Webb to withdraw its initial complaint, it would have
in effect been giving Del Webb the Rule 4 choice-that is, the choice of paying to stop pollution or
not paying and allowing the pollution to continue. Or at a minimum, future developers will realize
that suing in this jurisdiction may be choosing to pay for an injunction.
3. GEORGE GAMOW, ONE TWO THREE. . . INFINITY 108 (1961); STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES 10 (1988).
4. Indeed, it is possible to find probably a dozen other articles with a similar narrative. See,
e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls,40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedralin Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442 (1995).
5. Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-56 (1993).
6. Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 729-33 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Richard
Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091
(1997); Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 471; Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of
the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997). Because the entitlements at issue in nuisance disputes
are usually not susceptible to trading in thick markets, many results of financial economics-such
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helped Calabresi and Melamed discover the missing Rule 4, the call option
recategorization naturally leads to consideration of not one, but two additional
missing categories.
A call option is an option to buy. The option holder can force a sale at the
exercise price even if the seller does not want to sell. Rules 2 and 4 have just
these "call" qualities. Under Rule 2, the Polluter has a call option-the choice
to pay damages-the choice, in effect, to buy the Resident's right to clean air
and, therefore, to be able to continue polluting. The Resident begins with the
initial entitlement (to stop pollution), but the Polluter can force the Resident to
sell this right for a judicially determined amount. Rule 4 reverses the identity
of the Polluter and Resident. Under Rule 4, the Polluter has the initial
entitlement, and the Resident has the call option. The Resident can force the
Polluter to sell this right to pollute for a judicially determined amount.
Once a liability rule was conceived of as giving someone a. call option, it
became almost inevitable that scholars would wonder whether "put option" rules
might not also be possible. A put option is an option to sell. While call options
give the option holder the choice of whether to pay a non-negotiated amount (the
exercise price), put options give the option holder the choice of whether to be
paid a non-negotiated amount. Call options when exercised give rise to "forced
sales"; put options give rise to "forced purchases."
Rule 2 gives the choice of whether to pay to the Polluter; Rule 4 gives the
choice of whether to pay to the Resident. Scholars thinking about the classic
Rule 2 and Rule 4 cases-BoomeP and Spurt-have often only focused on the
difference between who pays (the Polluter or the Resident), but a second
dimension exists of who chooses to force the payment. Rules 2 and 4 concern
a choice to pay, while the put options that are the focus of this Article concern
the choice to be paid.
Applied to nuisance disputes, the possibility of put options suggest two
additional rules. Each rule gives the initial entitlement holder a put option-the
option to force a non-consensual purchase on the other side:

as the Black-Scholes option pricing formula-which rely on a commonly shared value for the
underlying asset at any particular moment in time do not apply. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 476-80 (1996). In private correspondence, Paul
Mahoney has proven that several of the rules described in this paper would provide equal payoffs
if the parties contracted for option rights in thick markets. Correspondence from Paul G. Mahoney,
Professor of Law University of Virginia School of Law, to Ian Ayres (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with
author).
7. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
8. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (Cameron,
V.C.J.).
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Rule 5:

a court might allow a Polluter to continue polluting, but
also give the Polluter the choice to stop polluting and to
receive damages from the Resident; and
Rule 6: a court might allow a Resident to enjoin pollution, but
also give the Resident the option of waiving his
injunctive rights in return for damages from the
Polluter.
Table 1 can be expanded as shown in Table 2 to help flesh out the underlying
structure of the six rules.
Table 2. Incorporating the Possibility of "Put Options" Rules

Method of Protection
Liability Rule
Property Rule

Initial
Entitlement
Held By

(Initial Entitlement
Held Subject To

"Put Option" or
e"Foced Purchase"
Rule
anitial Enitement

Otr Side's Call

HolderAlso Has Put

Option to Pay)

Option To Be Paid)

Resident

Rule 1

Rule 2

Rule 6

Polluter

Rule 3

Rule 4

Rule 5

The rules in the upper and lower rows are identical except for the identity of the
initial entitlement holder. This can easily be seen by comparing Rules 1 and 3.
Each gives a property-rule protected entitlement to the Resident or Polluter
respectively. But it also applies to Rules 5 and 6 which are similar except that
under Rule 5 the Polluter has the initial entitlement and a put option while under
Rule 6 the Resident has the initial entitlement and a put option.9 The rules in
the three columns of the table differ only as to which party has the option to
force a non-consensual transfer of the initial entitlement: under a property rule,
neither side has an option to force a transfer; under a liability rule, the nonentitlement holder has an option to force the entitlement holder to sell; and

9. It would have been more natural to give the top row consecutive numbers. This table,
however, like a gothic cathedral has been added onto over time. I have chosen to label the polluter
put as Rule 5 merely to conform to Saul Levmore's prior usage. See Levmore, supra note 6, at
2163.
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under what I am calling a "put option" or "forced purchase" rule, the
entitlement holder has the option to force the non-entitlement holder to
purchase. 10
The option recharacterization not only allows us to see the possibility of
two more rules, but also clarifies that liability rules (and "put option" rules) are
not merely different ways of protecting an entitlement. They can also be
thought of as different ways of dividing the parties' claims to the entitlement.
As Carol Rose recently wrote:
[Under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the whole
meatball, so to speak, and the other party has nothing-one has
property, the other has zip. Under either of the two liability rules, on
the other hand, the meatball gets split: The factory has an option to
pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while the homeowner has a
property right subject to an option (or easement). For the sake of
simplicity, I will refer to this kind of right as a PRSTO (or PRSTE),
for "property right subject to an option (or easement).""
Under this view, options merely divide the claims to an entitlement in a different
way than say a physical or temporal partition. 2 The ways that our six rules
divide the parties' claims to an entitlement are depicted in Table 3.
Table 3. Possible "Derivative" Divisions of an Entitlement

How Different Rules Divide Parties' Claims to an Asset
Rule I
Rule 2
Rule 3

Resident's Claim
Asset
Asset - Call
0

Polluter's Claim
0
Call
Asset

Rule 4

Call

Asset - Call

Rule 5
Rule 6

- Put
Asset + Put

Asset + Put
- Put

10. Another column might be added to Table 2, in which either party could force a nonconsensual transfer. This regime would be equivalent to giving the initial entitlement holder a put
option that is simultaneously subject to a call. See Morris, supra note 5, at 856 (discussing this
possibility).
11. Rose, supra note 6, at 2178-79.
12. See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 6 (discussing dimensions that an entitlement might
be divided into, including put and call divisions).
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Table 3 shows how the finite claims to an entitlement are divided by the six
rules. Each of the rules maintains conservation of matter,' 3 in that the sum of
the Polluter's and Resident's assets and liabilities under each rule nets out to
"Asset." As Rose noted, a property rule (such as Rules 1 and 3) gives one
party everything and the other person "zip." But, other divisions are possible.
Rose saw that having a "PRSTO" is the same as owning the asset subject to a
liability (depicted by the "- Call") in that one might be forced to sell against
one's will (for a price less than the asset's true value). 4
Table 3 highlights the radical nature of the "put option" rules. In
distributional terms, Rules 5 and 6 go beyond the whole meatball/zip division
of traditional property rules. It is possible to have less than zero. The "put
option" rules give the initial entitlement holder everything that she would have
under a property rule plus a put option. This necessarily implies that the nonentitlement holder has a liability (denoted by "- Put")-i.e., she might be forced
to purchase against her will (for a price that is more than her true value)."5
Possibly because of this seemingly extreme distributional result,16 the legal
academy has largely rejected "put option" rules as an impractical legal remedy.
Richard Epstein, for example, has recently argued: "[L]iability rules, when
used, always take the direction of a 'call' . . . . Puts, therefore, are never
imposed as a matter of law on strangers but are the outgrowth of consensual

13. Hohfeld long ago showed that rights are relational. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
FundamentalLegalConceptions asApplied in JudicialReasoning,26 YALE L.J. 710(1917); Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). My right (or asset) can be seen as an obligation (or liability) on someone
else's part. The Table's summing to zero captures the Hohfeldian requirement.
14. Seeing liability rules as "derivative" divisions that partition the claims to an entitlement into
two parts makes explicit the idea that changing the types of "protection" actually changes the content
of the rule. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986). Seeing liability rules as merely asset divisions also calls into question
Richard Epstein's claim for the dominance of "property rules." Because both the PRSTO and the
call option are themselves protected by property rules (see Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 707),
his claim must not just be a claim about how entitlements should be protected but a claim about what
bundle of strongly protected claims must be bundled together (unpartitioned).
15. While being forced to purchase non-consensually is termed a liability, being subject to the
entitlement holder's call does not necessarily mean that the non-entitlement holder will be made
worse off in expected utility terms. If the non-entitlement holder would be willing to pay $80 for
the entitlement and is "forced" to buy it for $50, she will be glad the other side exercised its put
option. Two articles have shown that optimally structured "put option" regimes need not erode the
non-entitlement's expected payoff compared with a simple property rule regime where the nonentitlement holder begins with "zip." Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1063; Ayres & Balkin,
supranote 6, at 731. See infra at 16 (discussing how put liability may not, however, lower expected
payoff).
16. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 472-73; Levmore, supra note 6, at 2163; Morris,
supra note 5, at 855-56.
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transactions over organized markets." 7 For Epstein, "put option" rules are
a missing category, but as a normative matter Epstein believes this to be a happy
state of affairs. The legal academy treats the put possibility as an exotic
curioso. No one believes that we will be Spurred into seeing its relevance.
The dual thesis of this Article is that put options are a traditional part of the
common law and that they should remain so. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the
common law does use "put options"-the right to force a non-consensual
purchase-as a mechanism for protecting entitlements: (1) if Calabresi steals
Melamed's watch, Melamed has the option of suing to recover the watch
(replevin) or suing to receive the watch's value (trover); (2) if Calabresi is a
holdover tenant in Melamed's apartment, Melamed has the option of suing to
enjoin Calabresi's continuing trespass or (at least in some jurisdictions) suing to
force Calabresi to rent for up to an entire additional year; and (3) if Calabresi
builds an encroaching wall on Melamed's land, Melamed has the option of suing
to force Calabresi to remove the wall or suing to force Calabresi to permanently
buy the encroached land. In each of these examples, after Calabresi takes
Melamed's entitlement, the common law gives Melamed a put option-the
option to choose court-determined damages (for permanently ceding the
entitlement to the defendant) or injunctive relief (to require the entitlement).
Surprisingly, however, the victims of nuisance are not routinely given a similar
put option. If Calabresi pollutes Melamed's land, Melamed is not given an
analogous put option. This Article suggests that put options at times should be
used to protect property in the nuisance context as well.
These common law puts can be seen as the second stage of a two-part
process. In the first stage, a potential taker decides whether to take, and in the
second stage, the initial entitlement holder decides whether to exercise her
put-that is whether to seek return of her entitlement or permanent monetary
damages. Appreciating the two stage nature of many put option regimes also
clarifies the roles of puts in deterring or facilitating the initial first-stage taking.
This Article is divided into three Sections. The first Section will make the
normative case for put options rules. The second Section will detail how the
common law has used put options to protect property. The final Section will
argue that put options rules-particularly Rule 6-should be used to resolve
nuisance disputes and will consider how courts should set damages. While
damages-in option lingo, the exercise price of the put-are often set to deter
the initial taking, this Section will explore when courts should adopt less extreme
damages which-like the damages in Boomer-encourage a limited amount of
first-stage taking.

17. Epstein, supra note 6, at 2093-94.
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I. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR PUTS

This Section attempts to synthesize and extend previous arguments for the
use of puts. In doing so, it also presents the intellectual history of this idea.
Six articles in the last six years have already considered the potential utility of
put options,'" but the articles have largely written past each other. The casual
reader in this literature is unlikely to see the connections in part because the
same basic rule has been described variously as a put option,' 9 a reverse
liability rule,2" the double reverse twist,2 reverse-reverse damages,2 a
startling rule, 23 and Rule 5.4 This Article attempts to unify the literature
behind the more descriptive terms "put option" or "forced purchase" rules.'
Taken as a whole, this literature suggests reasons why put options should be a
vibrant part of our jurisprudence. This does not mean, however, that Rules 5
and 6 should devour the other four categories-only that they deserve their place
in the cathedral.
To begin, it is useful to clear away the only explicit criticism of put option
rules-that of Richard Epstein. After Epstein's aforementioned claim that
liability rules "when used, always take the direction of a 'call,"' 26 he goes on
to explain:
The reason seems clear. A liability rule is typically adopted to counter
the monopoly position of the holder of the asset. The holder of cash
has no monopoly position at all, so it is very hard to believe that by
allowing the present holder of some specific asset to designate the
person who must take it off his hands, we advance any conceivable
measure of social welfare.'
This argument has considerable superficial appeal. Money is a unique asset in
part because owners rarely develop idiosyncratic, subjective value for cash in

18. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 731; Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1063; Epstein,
supra note 6, at 2093, 2099-100; Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 470; Levmore, supra note 6,
at 2160; Morris, supra note 5, at 853.
19. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1063; Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 731.
20. See Morris, supra note 5, at 854.
21. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 470.
22. Id.
23. See Levmore, supra note 6, at 2160.
24. Id. at 2163.
25. Admittedly not much turns on a name. But while the various "reverse" permutations are
colorful, they do not as clearly connote the core attribute that this type of rule gives an entitlement
holder the option to sell (which amounts to an option to force a purchase).
26. Epstein, supra note 6, at 2092.
27. Id. at 2094 (emphasis added).
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the same way that they might for a grandparent's jewelry or other thinly traded
entitlements. But the argument unravels when read in conjunction with
Epstein's argument in favor of call options. Epstein believes that traditional
liability rules-which amount to call options-are appropriate where there is a
severe holdout problem caused by a bilateral monopoly. According to Epstein,
"[t]hese holdout situations arise when the resource currently commanded by A
is needed by B, such that each can deal only with the other for the useful
exchange to take place."2" But if call options can be useful to overcome
bilateral monopoly problems, why cannot put options be useful? Epstein's core
argument against puts, that "the holder of cash has no monopoly position at all,"
is belied by his own bilateral monopoly example (which happens to appear on
the following page of his article). If A, the initial entitlement holder, "can deal
only with" B, then the holder of cash has a monopoly position. If B is the only
possible buyer, we might want to give A a put option to overcome B's inefficient
incentive to holdout for a low price.29 Epstein is right that it makes little sense
to allow the present holder of some asset to have complete freedom in
"designat[ing] the person who must take it off his hands," but it can make
eminent sense in the bilateral monopoly settings (where evidence suggests there
is a single potential buyer) for the law to give the seller a put option to mitigate
buyer's monopoly position-just as the law in other bilateral monopoly situations
gives the buyer a call option to overcome the seller's monopoly position.
Carol Rose has acutely observed that my previous option analysis has a
contractual shadow as its paradigmatic example: "The contractual relationship
has only a discrete number of parties-paradigmatically two-who ...are stuck
with each other."' Rose is clearly right that contractual renegotiations often
involve limited numbers and a bilateral monopoly. For example, once Epstein
agrees to cut Rose's hair, Rose is the only one with whom Epstein can bargain
if he wants to buy back his promise.3 But, while contracts may serve as a
fine paradigmatic example, the option approach is a powerful way to analyze
any bilateral monopoly situation-that is any situation where there are two (or
a small number of) people who "are stuck with each other."32 For the

28. Id. (emphasis added). A bilateral monopoly exists when "circumstances limit each side to
a single trading partner." Id. at 2092.
29. The common law does not give the entitlement holder carte blanche to designate the person
who must take it off his hands, just as the law does not give the owner of a call the power to take
anybody's property. Rather, when evidence of a bilateral monopoly exists, the law at times might
grant either a call or a put to overcome the monopoly position that each party has.
30. Rose, supra note 6, at 2187.
31. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 745.
32. Rose, supra note 6, at 2183. Rose characteristically hits the nail on the head when she
says: "Ayres and Talley are interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other,
thin markets instead of 'thick' ones. Neighboring landowners seem to fit that bill." Id. at 2183.
But she engages in a bit of playful overstatement when she later says: "Ayres and Talley are not
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purposes of this Article, I accept Epstein's premise that liability rules are only
appropriate in situations of a bilateral monopoly. 3 Throughout virtually all of
the Article, I assume that the bilateral monopoly "holdup" problem is so severe
that courts do not want to rely on consensual trade to assure allocational
efficiency. Judge Richard Posner has argued that the holdup problem may be
especially acute when a property rule (Rules 1 or 3) creates a substantial
bargaining range. In discussing Boomer, Judge Posner found:
An injunction against the nuisance could therefore have created a huge
bargaining range ... and the costs of negotiating to a point within it
might have been immense. If the market value of the [Polluter's]
factory was actually $45 million, the plaintiffs [Residents] would be
tempted to hold out for a price to dissolve the injunction in the tens of
millions and the factory would be tempted to refuse to pay anything
more than a few hundred thousand dollars. Negotiations would be
unlikely to break down completely, given such a bargaining range, but
they might well be protracted and costly.'
Boomer provides the paradigmatic example for my analysis. Because of the
large bargaining range and/or because of enmity between the bilateral
monopolists, courts are worried that property rules create the possibility of
unacceptably large bargaining costs, and even worse, the small chance that the
parties will each hold out for so much and so long that the factory is
inefficiently closed down. In just this type of circumstance, where most law and
economic scholars would embrace liability rules over property rules, I want to
argue that Epstein's theory fails to explain why calls should dominate puts as a
way to overcome the holdout problem.
Indeed, from an option perspective, put options share the same core
advantage of traditional liability rules: they harness the private information of
the option holder. Kaplow and Shavell formalized the insights of Calabresi and
Melamed in showing that a liability rule can induce efficient takings.35 If the
option exercise price is set at the court's best estimate of the non-option holder's

really thinking about real estate. Those footnote references to Boomer and Spur Industries are
essentially a smokescreen." Id. at 2187. I think we were "really thinking about" bilateral
monopoly. Because these come up in nuisance disputes between neighboring landowners, this is one
of the contexts that we were really thinking about.
33. But see Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1058 (arguing that liability rules may be more
efficient than property rules even when transaction costs are small); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
DistinguishingBetween Consensual andNonconsensualAdvantages ofLiability Rules, 105 YALE L.J.
235 (1995).
34. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1992).
35. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
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value,26 the option holder will exercise the call option only when the forced
sale is, on average, efficient. Under Rule 2, for example, the Polluter will only
choose to pollute if it believes its value to be larger than the expected value of
the Resident. But put options can analogously harness the private information
of the put holder. If the put's exercise price is set equal to the non-option
holder's value, the put holder will only exercise the put option when a forced
purchase is on average efficient. Thus, under Rule 6, a Resident will force the
Polluter to buy the right to pollute only when the Resident values the entitlement
less than the average value of the Polluter. The great non-consensual advantage
of either calls or puts is that, when private bargaining is not practicable, the
courts can enhance efficiency even if they can only estimate the expected value
of one side. 7 Boomer gave the Polluter a call option-an option to acquire the
ability to pollute even over the residents' objections-because the court worried,
in the shadow of a Rule 1 injunction, that the parties may not be able to agree
to a consensual trade. But whenever a court thinks that Rule 2 is potentially
appropriate, it should consider whether giving the residents the choice to force
a non-consensual purchase furthers the same end.
But appreciating the deep similarities between puts and calls does not help
identify the circumstances in which courts should prefer puts to calls. While
both puts and calls can harness the private information of the option holder, this
Section will identify differences which might lead courts to choose puts (Rules
5 & 6) instead of calls (Rules 3 & 4). For convenience, the discussion is
organized around three categories: distributional, informational, and bid-ask
differences.
A. DistributionalDifferences
A number of scholars have noted that put option rules give the initial
entitlement holder a larger expected payoff than either property or liability rule
regimes . 38 As shown in Table 3, Rule 1 gives the Resident the entitlement
(without calls or puts); Rule 3 gives the Resident the entitlement minus, or
subject to, the Polluter's call option; but Rule 6 gives the Resident the
entitlement plus a put option. The distributional difference can provide an
important difference for choosing between puts and calls.

36.
100.
37.
38.
note 5,

The appropriate size of the exercise price is discussed infra text accompanying notes 93See Ayres & Talley, supra note 33, at 235.
See Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 473; Levmore, supranote 6, at 2163; Morris, supra
at 855-56.
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Krier and Schwab have persuasively argued that this distributional
difference can help courts better accommodate concerns of both efficiency and
equity. In a high transaction cost setting, if a court concluded that the Resident
was the more efficient decisionmaker, 39 it would be driven under Calabresi and
Melamed's analysis toward Rule 4. The Resident could stop the pollution, but
only if it were willing to pay-and sacrifice a large part of its expected payoff.
Krier and Schwab's central insight is that using puts allows a court to give the
choice to one side without forcing that party to pay for a right that in equity
should be its to begin with. Under Rule 6, the Resident can be given the
pollution decision without sacrificing its expected payoff.' Indeed, giving the
Resident the initial entitlement plus a put guarantees that the Resident will never
be undercompensated.
But surprisingly, put option rules need not reduce the expected payoff of
the non-option holder-the party that might be subject to a forced purchase. To
see why this is so, it is important to distinguish between two different
information perspectives. The ex ante perspective assesses the parties' expected
payoffs before they acquire information about their own payoffs. The interim
perspective assesses the parties' expected payoffs after they learn their own
values but before learning the other side's value. From the ex ante perspective,
the possibility of being subject to a forced purchase does not produce a negative
expected payoff. Under Rule 6, a Polluter may be forced to purchase the right
to pollute. But if the price is set at the Polluter's expected valuation, the
Polluter's expected payoff is zero. Rule 6 can increase the Resident's payoff
above what she would expect under a traditional property regime (Rule 1),
without reducing what the Polluter would expect under a property rule regime.
To see this, imagine that after all the evidence has been submitted, the
court's best estimate is that the Polluter values the right to pollute somewhere
between $0 and $100 million, and that the Resident values the right to stop
pollution somewhere between $0 and $100 million. More formally, assume that
the Polluter's and Resident's values are independently and uniformly distributed.
And, finally, assume that, either because of enmity or the bargaining range
problem identified previously by Judge Posner, the parties are unlikely to
consensually transfer the entitlement if the court chooses either of the property
rules. With these assumptions, it is possible to analyze the expected (ex ante)
payoffs of the three rules giving the initial entitlement to the Resident:

39. Krier and Schwab focus on the relative number or Polluters and Residents as the primary
determinant of efficient decision-making. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 473.
40. Rule 6 can force a Polluter to pay for the right to pollute, but this rule does not obligate
the Polluter to pollute if she does not want to exercise this new found right.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 [1998], Art. 1

806

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Table 4. Expected Payoffs Under Different Rules Giving Initial Entitlement to
Resident

Expected Payoffs (Ex Ante)
Resident

Polluter

Joint

Rule 1

$50

$0

$50

Rule 2
(damages = $50)

$50

$12.50

$62.50

Rule 6

$62.50

$0

$62.50

(damages = $50)

As shown in Table 4, the Boomer-like Rule 2 does help overcome the bilateral
monopoly holdup problem. If consensual trade is impracticable, then Rule 1
will simply produce an expected value of $50 million for the Resident (the
Resident's mean value of stopping) pollution. Under Rule 1 (with no consensual
trade), the Polluter will never pollute and therefore will have a zero expected
payoff. However, Rule 2 (with damages equaling $50 million) harnesses the
Polluter's private information. The court should expect that the Polluter will
choose to pollute (and pay $50 million) if its valuation is greater than the $50
million damages. The court expects this to happen with a 50% probability and
when the Polluter does choose to pay damages, it will on average have a $75
million value. A 50% chance of a $25 million profit ($75 million - $50
damages) gives the Polluter an expected payoff under Rule 2 of $12.5 million.
But Rule 2 does not reduce the Resident's expected payoff. If the Polluter does
not take, the Resident still expects to control what on average will be a $50
million entitlement, and when the Polluter does take, the Resident is given $50
million in compensation. 4 Thus, Rule 2 succeeds, even in the absence of
consensual trade in helping the entitlement flow to the higher valuer-raising the
expected joint payoffs from $50 to $62.5 million.
But Table 4 shows that Rule 6 is just as effective in overcoming the
bilateral monopoly problem. If the parties are unable to contract in the shadow
of Rule 1, then Rule 6 (with $50 million damages) will induce the Resident to
pollute when its value is less than $50 million. While Rule 2 harnesses the
Polluter's private information, the put option harnesses the Resident's private
information. Under Rule 6, half of the time the Resident puts its entitlement for
$50 million, and half of the time the Resident retains the entitlement when its

41. The assumption that the Polluter's and Resident's valuations are independent is crucial to
this analysis. Kaplow and Shavell discuss the more complicated question of correlated valuations.
See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 35.
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value is on average $75 million. A 50% chance of $50 million and a 50%
chance of $75 million, thus, gives the Resident an expected payoff of $62.5
million. On the other hand, the Polluter has $0 expected payoff. Fifty percent
of the time the Polluter does not pollute (and has a $0 payoff), and 50% of the
time the Polluter must pay $50 million for an entitlement that it values on
average at $50 million (again producing an expected $0 payoff).
Table 4 shows that Rules 2 and 6 each help overcome the potential autarkic
inefficiencies of Rule 1, but that puts and calls allocate these improvements in
efficiencies to different parties. Rule 2 keeps the Resident's expected payoff
fixed at its Rule 1 level and distributes all of the gains in efficiency to the
Polluter. Rule 6, in contrast, keeps the Polluter's expected payoff fixed at its
Rule 1 level and distributes all of the gains in efficiency to the Resident. Thus,
Rule 6 can increase the Resident's payoff above what she would expect under
a traditional property regime (Rule 1) without reducing what the Polluter would
expect.
However, the results of Table 4 do not necessarily hold for the interim
perspective-that is, where expected payoffs are calculated conditional to the
parties knowing their value of pollution. From the interim perspective, Rule 6
might create a negative expected payoff. If the Polluter knows that its valuation
is less than the mean value (for similarly situated Polluters), then it realizes that
it might be forced to pay more for the right to pollute than its known value.
The interim perspective may be more relevant to judging the equities at the time
a put option is exercised. However, the ex ante expected payoffs may be more
relevant for predicting how put option rules will affect investment decisions.
For example, if at the moment of investing, the Polluter does not know what its
value will be, then put options will not produce a lower expected payoff for the
Polluter then it would expect under a property rule.
The distributional difference between puts and calls can have important
affects on the parties' ex ante investment incentives. If lawmakers think that it
is particularly important to give the Resident an incentive to invest in her land,
then giving the Resident the initial entitlement plus a put will give her a stronger
ex ante incentive to invest. 42 For example, in our Table 4 scenario, a Resident
may be willing ex ante to invest only up to $50 million under Rule 1, but might
be willing to invest up to $62.5 under Rule 6. Put option rules, thus, not only
allow lawmakers to accommodate competing equity and efficiency concerns,
they can even help lawmakers to accommodate competing efficiency
concerns-the concern with ex ante investment efficiency and the concern with
ex post taking efficiency.

42. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 733.
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Finally, the distributional differences between puts and calls can also give
rise to a risk-aversion theory for preferring puts. The payoffs for puts and calls
not only have different means, but different variances. Put option rules not only
increase the expected pay of the initial entitlement holder, they also reduce the
variance of the initial entitlement holder's payoff. Put more formally, from
either ex ante or interim perspective:
1. The mean of payoffs for initial entitlement holder is higher with a
put than a call; and
2. The variance of payoffs for initial entitlement holders is lower with
a put than a call.
This reduction in variance makes intuitive sense: under a call option, the fate
of the initial entitlement's holder is decided by the other side, but under a put
option, the initial entitlement holder decides her own fate and, thereby, can limit
fluctuations in her own payoff. Therefore, if lawmakers believe that the
Resident is substantially more risk averse than the Polluter, then the law would
do better to prefer a put option rule-such as Rule 6 to a traditional liability rule
3
(Rule 2).1
B. Information-ForcingDifferences
Puts and calls also have different information-forcing effects that might
affect whether the parties are able to trade. While most of this Article assumes
that transaction costs make consensual trades extremely difficult, this Section
explores how puts and calls might still be more efficient than traditional property
regimes when transaction costs are relatively low." Ayres and Talley showed
that option regimes have an information-forcing effect on the non-option holder.
Calls and puts, by dividing the claims to an entitlement between the two parties
(as shown in Table 3), create two different types of value-enhancing trade. For
some private valuations, it will be efficient for the one side to buy the other
43. See Morris, supra note 5, at 855 ("Arrangements such as puts, for instance, permit
investors to control their ratios of risk to potential profits in ways consistent with their own risk
preferences.").
44. The law and economics community persists in thinking that property rules dominate option
(put or call) rules when transaction costs are low. But, at least, in circumstances of bilateral
monopoly, no scholar to date has identified a reason why we would expect trade to be more efficient
in the shadow of property rules than in the shadow of option rules. By the Coase theorem, we know
that trade will be equally efficient under any regime when transacting is costless. But for some
reason, scholars persist in thinking that property rules dominate when an epsilon amount of
transaction costs are added.
As emphasized in my previous writing (see Ayres & Talley, supra note 6), a strong case for
property rules can be made in terms of producing superior ex ante investment incentives but it is
much more difficult to justify the rules in terms of ex post trading efficiency.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss3/1

Ayres: Protecting Property with Puts

1998]

PROTECTING PROPERTY WITH PUTS

809

side's option (effectively bribing the option holder not to exercise). For other
valuations, it will be efficient to trade the underlying entitlement.
Ayres and Talley showed that under call and put option regimes the nonoption holder could credibly signal information about her value by merely
expressing interest in one type of trade or the other.45 For example, under a
Rule 2 call option regime, the Resident as the non-option holder could credibly
signal whether she had a relatively high or low value merely by expressing an
interest in buying the Polluter's option to pollute or expressing an interest in
selling her initial entitlement to stop pollution. However, under a Rule 6 put
option regime, it is the Polluter instead as the non-option holder who now can
credibly signal her value. A low-valuing Polluter might bribe the Resident not
to exercise her put option, while a high-valuing Polluter might purchase the
Resident's initial entitlement to stop pollution.
Appreciating that this information-forcing effect operates on the non-option
holder suggests that courts can induce Residents to reveal information by
adopting either Rules 2 or 5 and can induce Polluters to reveal information by
adopting either Rules 4 or 6. Private information of one side often is a major
barrier to consensual trade. ' From an information-forcing perspective, courts
might want to give the option to the party whose valuation is more certain so as
to induce the non-option holder to speak more honestly about its valuation. Put
post informationoption rules allow judges more flexibility to accommodate ex
47
forcing and ex ante investment or ex post equity concerns.
C. Bid-Ask Differences
Finally, put and call options differ in that calls turn on a buyer's willingness
to pay while puts turn on a seller's willingness to accept. For both cognitive
and wealth effect reasons, it is often the case that a particular person will

45. Id. at 1063.
46. For example, it might be relatively straightforward to estimate the lost economic profit of
a Polluter, but substantially more difficult for a Resident to speak credibly about whether its
subjective losses from pollution are high or low.
47. Madeline Morris has also suggested that put option rules might be effective in inducing
entitlement holders to reveal when they own an entitlement that the government wants to
purchase-such as guns or empty soda bottles. See Morris, supra note 5, at 855 ("[g]un buy-out
offers by police departments and soft-drink container deposit redemption laws represent instances
where Reverse Liability rules are used to create incentives for individuals to dispose of certain goods
in socially desirable ways"). As a conceptual matter, the government could exercise its eminent
domain call option to non-consensually take these items. The practical problem is that the
government does not know who has the unlicenced guns or empty soda bottles. Under these
circumstances, some governments have given citizens put options-via gun buy-back programs or
bottling deposit laws-which give citizens the option to sell.
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demand a higher price when selling an entitlement than she would be willing to
pay if forced to buy.48 As Saul Levmore has noted in discussing put options:
Armed with the legal right to be free of pollution, [a Resident] might
have demanded $100,000, for example before allowing [a Polluter] to
send effluents her way, so that [the Resident's] damages from [the
Polluter's] operation can fairly be said to amount to $100,000; but this
does not mean that [the Resident] could or would pay this amount to
stop [the Polluter], if the law requires [the Resident] to pay in order
to [stop pollution] ."
This suggests that a range of intermediate exercise prices-above a person's
willingness to pay but below her willingness to accept-will often exist for
which the law's determination of an initial entitlement will stick. For this range
of exercise prices, under Rule 6 the person would not put (opt to sell) the
entitlement if she were originally endowed with it, and under Rule 4 she would
not call (opt to buy) the entitlement if she were not originally endowed with it.
This should not be surprising. It has long been known that endowment effects
impede trade in the shadow of property rules; this result carries over to option
regimes.
What is more controversial is whether lawmakers should privilege
endowment effects in cost-benefit calculus. If a Resident values an entitlement
(more than a Polluter) merely because she is initially endowed with it,
lawmakers might want to set a low call option price to allow the Polluter to take
control of the entitlement and benefit from its own endowment effect. One
goal-to be traded off against other equity goals-would be to produce a legal
regime where the entitlement flowed to the person who would have the highest
willingness to accept.50 From an efficiency standpoint, this would rank people

48. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Note,
Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient EntitlementAllocation,
46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994).
49. Levmore, supra note 6, at 2166.
50. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 225,
232-34, 245-47 (1991) (claiming that WTA should always be used rather than WTP). Russell
Korobkin, however, has suggested reasons why allocating entitlements on the basis of willingness
to accept is inappropriate when there are independent social norms against selling certain types of
entitlements:
Narrowly stated, our society teaches us that we should not sell some things, although
buying them is socially acceptable. Although an individual might, in a cultural vacuum,
prefer a specific quantity of money to a certain entitlement, he might feel that selling the
entitlement is improper and, therefore, his WTA will exceed his WTP. This explanation
has been called the "dignity hypothesis."
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by their value of "having" rather than their value of "not having." Other things
being equal, this would lead toward giving the initial entitlement to the party
with the larger endowment effect. 5
The advantage of put option rules is, again, that they can help lawmakers
accommodate competing concerns. Efficiency considerations might militate
toward giving the initial entitlement to the party with the larger endowment
effect. But if this is the party that the court believes is also the more efficient
chooser,52 then the court can accommodate both efficiency concerns by giving
the party both the initial entitlement and a put option.53 Without the "put
option" rules, the court would have to choose between either giving this
preferred party the initial entitlement (to take advantage of the endowment
effect) or a call (to take advantage of the better chooser effect).
Finally, it is not clear whether the endowment effect persists in the shadow
of option regimes. The path-breaking mug experiments of Kahneman, Knetsh,
and Thaler only tested whether entitlements protected by property rules gave rise
to endowment effects. 54 It is much less clear whether endowments protected
by liability rules-i.e., subject to someone else's call option'-give rise to the
same effect. In the shadow of a call option, the initial entitlement holder has a
more transient, less secure claim to the entitlement and, thus, may not establish
the cognitive bond that in part may give rise to the effect. In fact, Jeff
Rachlinski and Forest Jourden have recently conducted experiments showing that
the endowment effect is largely extinguished in the shadow of traditional liability
(call option) rules. 55 However, put options may heighten the endowment

Korobkin, supra note 48, at 691-92.
51. For example, imagine that a Polluter and a Resident in a world without endowment effects
would both have values for the entitlement ranging between say $40 and $60, but that endowment
effects cause the Resident's WTP to be $5 lower than it would otherwise be, and cause the
Resident's WTA to be $5 higher than it would otherwise be. The endowment effect on Resident
would raise the Resident's average value of having the entitlement to $55 which is higher than the
average $50 of having the entitlement for the Polluter. Under these assumptions, joint payoffs are
maximized by giving the entitlement to the Resident-the party with the larger endowment effect.
Rules 2 and 6 give rise to larger joint payoffs than rules 4 and 5.
52. As discussed above, a court might consider one side to be the more efficient chooser either
because it has lower decision costs-multiple decision-makers have higher collective action problems
than unitary decision-makers-or because it has a higher option value. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
53. As before, put option rules could also allow lawmakers to more easily accommodate
efficiency concerns or investment concerns together with the endowment effect concern.
54. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
55. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The Psychology of Ownership (Dec. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing that "the endowment effect may only occur
among legal entitlements that are protected by injunctive remedies"). This possibility was first
suggested in Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1102.
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effects. Put options give the initial entitlement holder even more control over
her "endowment" than traditional property rules, and this may enhance the
solidity of ownership.56 If the endowment effect is a source of real value that
we want to nurture-as opposed to a "status quo bias" or "framing effect" that
we want to overcome 5 -then put options may be a way to overcome the
inefficiencies of the holdup problem in bilateral monopoly settings without
destroying the "value of having."
In sum, theory suggests that courts, when choosing between different option
regimes (Rules 3 through 6), must decide which party should receive the initial
entitlement and which side should be given the option. The initial entitlement
might be allocated by efficiency-minded or equity-minded judges to the party (1)
who is more deserving; (2) who values the entitlement more at the time of the
dispute; (3) for whom investment incentives are more important (i.e., the party
who had a greater ex ante ability to develop the entitlement); or (4) who is likely
to have a larger endowment effect. And following Krier and Schwab, the option
should be allocated to the better chooser. When the better chooser turns out to
be the same party to whom the court wants to give the initial entitlement-for
either equity or efficiency reasons-then put options regimes (Rules 5 and 6) are
the natural solution.
However, just as there are multiple criteria for determining who is the
better owner of the initial entitlement, there are also multiple criteria for
determining who is the better owner of the option, that is, who is the better
chooser. Krier and Schwab focus almost solely on the relative number of
Polluters and Residents as the primary determinant of efficient decision-making.
Individual decision-makers are presumptively more efficient than multiple
decision-makers because they do not need to overcome collective action
problems. But there are other dimensions on which to determine who is the
more efficient decision-maker. Options are more valuable when there is a
greater variance in the value of the underlying asset. 58 This suggests that,
other things being equal, the party with more speculative damages is the more

56. Russell Korobkin, however, has suggested to me that the put option may commodify the
entitlement in the owner's mind in ways that reduce the endowment effect. Imagine that after a
pure-bred dog has puppies that a mother tells her daughter she can keep the puppies or sell them for
$50, after they are weened, to a neighbor who has made a firm offer. The daughter's knowledge
that she has a put option might stop her from bonding as closely with the puppies during the weening
period and hence mitigate the endowment effect.
57. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998).
58. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 6,at 555.
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efficient option holder. 9 Or alternately, as indicated above,'"because options
reduce the variance of the option holder's payoff (and conversely tend to
increase the variance of the non-option holder's payoff), the more risk-averse
party is, at lease on this dimension, the better chooser. Krier and Schwab's
central point, however, still holds true. Courts may decide that a Resident is the
efficient option holder without forcing this person to pay for the
entitlement-using Rule 6, it can give the party a put option to force a purchase,
when its value is low.
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE PREVALENCE OF PUTS

Richard Epstein surely states the conventional wisdom when he concludes
that "[p]uts . . .are never imposed as a matter of law on strangers but are the
outgrowth of consensual transactions over organized markets."6
Madeline
Morris, in searching for puts created by law instead of consensual transactions,
could only come up with the rather esoteric regulatory examples of "[glun
buy-out offers by police departments and soft-drink container deposit redemption
laws."62 Thus, even if the normative arguments or the previous Section are
correct, it seems that as a descriptive matter, like Rule 4 before Spur, Rules 5
and 6 are largely missing common law categories.
59. For an explicit example of the effect, see infra text accompanying note 76. This result is
only true in a world where bargaining is not possible. When transaction costs are low, the party
with the smaller variance in value may be the more efficient option holder, because of the
aforementioned information-forcing effect. See supra text accompanying note 44.
60. See supra text accompanying footnote 43.
61. Epstein, supra note 6, at 2093.
62. Morris, supra note 5, at 855.
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This Section argues, however, that the common law does impose puts that

are not the outgrowth of consensual transactions.'

In a variety of contexts,

when a person temporarily takes, invades, or impairs the entitlement of another,
the original entitlement holder is given the remedial choice of either regaining
the original unimpaired entitlement or permanently selling the entitlement to the
wrongful taker. Either remedial choice normally gives the wronged entitlement
holder monetary damages for the temporary taking. But with regard to the
future, this choice of remedy amounts to a put option: the initial entitlement
holder can choose to be paid or to permanently relinquish its rights, while the
wrongful taker might be forced to purchase an entitlement that she does not
want. Call options give the taker the option of paying for someone else's rights,
but the choice here is the option of being paid for relinquishing prospective
rights to an entitlement. This insight is not well known in the legal academy
with one rather curious exception. The only article which sees that the common
law of conversion gives "the owner of the thing . . . a 'put' that forced the
person who took the thing to purchase it for market value" also happens to be
the same article in which Epstein says there are no legally imposed puts.'M

63. Epstein is right that the common law does not impose puts on complete stangers, just as he
was right in saying that it serves little purpose in giving an initial entitlement holder carte blanche
in designating who must purchase the entitlement. But Epstein here is attacking a straw person.
His analysis seems to imply that law in establishing put regimes must give an entitlement holder puts
against the world or at lease to stangers who are not plausibly the highest valuers of the entitlement.
There is no reason, however, why the put holder's option to force a purchase cannot be restricted
to operate only against potential buyers in the bilateral monopoly context. Indeed, the advocates of
option regimes have explicitly argued that options (puts or calls) should only operate against nonoption holders who are potentially the highest valuers:
Lawmakers attempting to implement a Solomonic regime also face a serious
"identification" problem. . . . Restricting the class of partial owners to the set of
Nevertheless,
potentially highest valuers will be impossible in some contexts.
lawmakers or private parties themselves may be able to identify parties who ultimately
may become the highest valuers ....
[S]ome contexts naturally suggest a well-defined
set of potential owners that may help lawmakers mitigate the problems of over- and
under-inclusion. A limited set of adjoining landowners, for example, might sufficiently
define the set of potentially highest valuers with regard to local omissions or easements
for a view.
Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1086.
64. Epstein, supra note 6, at 2099. Epstein goes onto argue: "The 'forced sale' rule has come
under constant attack especially in cases of innocent takings, where it is usually rejected today.
What possible reason is there to believe that I want the ill-fitting galoshes that I took by mistake
from the opera cloakroom?" Id. at 2099-100. Epstein's analysis of this "forced sale" rule is
puzzling for several reasons. To begin, he does not provide any citations for his claim that the rule
has come "under constant attack." And for good reason, because the rle has not come under
constant attack. Second, while he attacks the use of all puts, he only suggests a basis for criticizing
innocent takings. He does not suggest a reason why there should not be put protection against
deliberate takings.
And most bizarrely, in an article trying to shore up the normative case for property protection,
Epstein fails to see that giving the aggrieved party a put is a way to deter takings. Even the person
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The implicit put option given to the aggrieved party in conversion can be
seen in the choice between trover and replevin. Under the traditional common
law, when personal property was converted to someone else's use, the owner

could either sue for money damages (trover) or for return of the good
(replevin). This choice of remedies gave the aggrieved owner a put against the
wrongful possessor: by beginning an action of trover, the plaintiff "waives his
right to obtain the return of the chattel and insists that the defendant be subjected

to a forced purchase of the chattel from him."'
And while trover and replevin concern the conversion of personal property,
the parallel actions of trespass and ejectment provide the owners of real property
with an analogous put. If Krier wrongfully possesses Schwab's land, Schwab
would traditionally have the choice between an action for possession (ejectment)
and an action for permanent damages (trespass).' 6 The put option afforded to
the aggrieved real property owner is particularly evident in the classic
encroachment case of Pile v. Pedrick.67 In Pile, the subterranean foundation
of the defendant's brick wall was found to encroach 1 and 3/8th inches
underneath the plaintiff's property. The court made explicit that the plaintiff
could choose between injunctive and monetary relief:

who took the galoshes by mistake was negligent compared to the owner. We might want to give
the aggrieved owner a put option to deter negligent takings. The choice of galoshes in his example
is also unfortunate for Epstein because there is no way to know the original owner still wants the
galoshes after Epstein places his feet in them. Kaplow and Shavell's analysis of optimal option
prices also solves Epstein's galoshes problem. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that the optimal exercise
price should be set at the court's best estimate of the non-option holder's value. Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 35, at 725. In the galoshes example, this might be a relatively small number, so that
most original owners would prefer the galoshes back rather than to exercise their put.
65. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 105 (3rd ed. 1993).
66. Id. at 107. The aggrieved property owner is not granted a put option when the government
invades its property. In inverse condemnation actions, if a court finds that the government has
temporarily taken part of a plaintiff's land, the government is given the call option of stopping (and
just paying temporary damages) or continuing and paying permanent damages. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 317 (1987)
("The Court has recognized in more than one case that the government may elect to abandon its
intrusion or discontinue regulations . . . . [Tihe landowner has no right under the Just
Compensation Clause to insist that a 'temporary' taking be deemed a permanent taking."). The
refusal to give aggrieved plaintiffs the choice might be justified as trying to make the parties' rights
consistent with the government's general eminent domain call option rights. However, there may
be times-particularly such as "condemnation blight" when the process of uncompleted
condemnation reduces the value of private property-when it may be appropriate for the
government's action to trigger a put option in the private landholder. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v.
J.W. Clement Co., 269 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1971); Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How
Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 788-90 (1973).
67. 31 A. 646 (Penn. 1895). I would like to thank Robert Ellickson for bringing this case to
my attention and for generally holding my hand throughout my maiden voyage as a property
professor.
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The trespass was then to be remedied in one of two ways. It could be
treated with the plaintiffs' consent as a permanent trespass and
compensated for in damages, or the defendants could be compelled to
remove the offending ends of the stones to the other side of the line.
The plaintiffs insisted upon the latter course, and the court below has
by its decree ordered that this should be done.6
The plaintiff in Pile thus had an option of forcing the defendant to purchase the
encroached land-even if the defendant preferred to take down the wall and just
pay temporary damages. 69
Put option rules are also used to protect landlords' rights with regard to
holdover tenants. The common law gave the landlord burdened by a holdover
tenant essentially two options: eviction (plus temporary damages), or the
creation of a new tenancy for a period of up to one year.7' The landlord could
regain possession of her real property or force the holdover tenant (tenant at
sufferance) to rent in the future-even if the tenant would just prefer to pay
temporary damages and leave.
All of these put examples have the same basic structure. When Levmore
impairs some entitlement of Rose, Rose is given the put option of either
regaining unimpaired use of the entitlement (usually plus damages for the
temporary taking) or giving up any future claims to the entitlement in return for
permanent damages. Levmore's temporary taking gives Rose a put option.
These examples show that put options are not the esoteric or missing category
that Epstein and others in the legal academy make them out to be.
Richard Epstein is right that puts are not imposed upon "strangers," but he
is wrong to think that they are only the outgrowths of consensual transactions.
Rather, when Levmore takes Rose's property, Levmore is no longer a stranger
to the property in question. If his taking is deliberate, he is expressing some
value for the property. What is more, Levmore's act of taking may reduce
Rose's value of the property. Rose may not want to use her toothbrush again
after Levmore has temporarily used it. 7 For both these reasons, there may be
uncertainty after the taking about who more highly values the tainted goods.

68. Id. at 647.
69. In the encroachment context, the plaintiffs put often has little value because the plaintiff
can increase her expected payoff by demanding an injunction and then demanding a large payment
from the defendant to avoid having to remove the trivial encroachment. See Ian Ayres & Kristin
Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance (June 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
70. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 65, at 431. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.4 cmt. f (1977).
71. See supra note 64 (discussing Epstein's galoshes).
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And given the non-consensual nature of the initial taking, there may be
substantial barriers to trade between these two parties. How can Rose bring
herself to bargain with a thief?
All the equities favor Rose, the aggrieved owner. But the genius of the
common law's giving Rose the choice of remedy is that it accommodates Rose's
equity interest with the efficiency interest in having entitlements flow to the
higher valuer. Puts or calls could satisfy the later interest, but giving the
aggrieved owner the put furthers both equity and efficiency. Giving Rose the
put option substantially reduces her risk of undercompensation-and instead
places it on the wrongdoer, Levmore. If the original owner does not think court
awarded damages are sufficient, she can simply choose to regain use of the
property herself. Even if the two parties are not locked in a bilateral monopoly
(because there may be third parties interested in buying the entitlement), the put
option gives the aggrieved landowner the ability to shift the market risk (the risk
and trouble of finding a buyer willing to pay the market) to the wrongdoer.
These puts are most closely analogous to Rule 6.2 Rule 6 gives the initial
entitlement to the Resident, but if the Polluter impairs the Resident's entitlement
(as in all of the foregoing common law examples), the Resident would have a
choice between permanent damages or injunctive relief. While the common law
uses put options to protect real property from physical trespass, encroachment,
and holdover tenants, put options are not traditionally used in the nuisance
context. Under the permanent nuisance doctrine, courts are not willing to award
permanent damages for nuisance if an injunction against the defendant is likely
to be effective in stopping the nuisance. 3 Accordingly, plaintiffs in nuisance
actions normally are not given the choice between injunctive and monetary
relief. If the nuisance is abatable, then an injunction is granted. If the nuisance
is not abatable, permanent damages are awarded. The plaintiff cannot choose
between regaining her unimpaired enjoyment or forcing the defendant to
purchase the prospective nuisance right-whether she wants to or not. The
permanent nuisance doctrine's effect in restricting plaintiff choice is in stark
contrast with the court's decision in Boomer. The Boomer court was willing to
give the Polluter the choice about whether to pay damages or stop polluting, but

72. Under Rule 6, the initial pollution gives the Resident a put option. The Resident begins
with the entitlement to be free of pollution, and if this entitlement is impaired by the Polluter's
nuisance, the Resident gains a put option. However, Rule 5 does seem to be a missing category.
73. Raymond D. Hiley, Involuntary Sale Damages in PermanentNuisance Cases: A Bigger
Bang from Boomer, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 61 (1986) ("[A] central question in permanent
nuisance cases is whether injunctive relief is available to the plaintiff."). See, e.g., Spaulding v.
Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1952); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 115 S.E. 451, 455
(W.Va. 1922) (overturning an award of permanent damages on the grounds that defendant's
chemical manufacturing plant was an abatable nuisance, and thus did not constitute a permanent
nuisance).
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the permanent nuisance doctrine often stops the Resident from having the choice
on whether to receive damages or have the polluting stopped.
III.

PuTrING UP WITH NUISANCE

The previous two Sections point toward a simple innovation: courts at
times should relax the permanent nuisance doctrine to give plaintiffs a put option
of choosing injunctive or permanent damage relief. Section I showed the
attractive qualities of put options. Section II showed the empirical prevalence
of put options. Here, I suggest that what is good policy in these other common
law contexts should also be available to judges deciding nuisance actions.
Before awarding the Polluter the Boomer-like (Rule 2/call option) choice of
whether to stop polluting or to pay for the right to continue polluting, courts
should consider whether equity and efficiency would be furthered more by
granting Rule 6 relief-that is, giving the Resident the choice to stop pollution
or to force a purchase.
This Article is not the first to consider using put options to resolve nuisance
disputes. Krier and Schwab (and then Levmore) include extended discussions
of the issue. But their focus has been almost solely on Rule 5 puts. For
example, Krier and Schwab ask us to consider the following scenario:
Suppose that if [a Polluter] (a party like Spur Industries) were to stay
in operation as and where it is; this would cause damages of
$100,000 to the [Residents] (people like the citizens in the Spur
Industries case). . . . Suppose also that the estimated value of [the
Polluter's] operations as a going concern (the present discounted value
of the future net profits) is either (a) $50,000 or (b) $500,000, and
that in either event abatement short of closing down the operations
would cost more than either of those amounts ...
The best-chooser axiom dictates that [the Polluter] be confronted
with the relevant choice. The justice assumption dictates that [the
Polluter] have the entitlement. Solution: The judge calculates, exactly
as the judge would in a rule two case, the [Residents'] damages if [the
Polluter] stays ($100,000). Next, the judge issues the peculiar order
we identified earlier: [the Polluter] may continue operating if it so
chooses, but if it closes down it will be awarded $100,000, with a
judgment against the [Residents] entered in that amount.74

74. Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 471-72.
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Their solution is a classic put option. In the Spur "coming to the nuisance" fact
pattern, the equities favor the pre-existing Polluter'-who is also the "best
chooser" because there are multiple Residents. Krier and Schwab's solution is
to give the Polluter both the entitlement (an unimpaired right to continue
polluting) plus a put option (the right to stop and force the Residents to pay
$100,000).
A. The Numerosity Problem
I believe that Krier and Schwab's focus on Rule 5 exclusively is misplaced.
The analysis of put options in other common law contexts suggest that Rule 6
is much more likely to be relevant. The "coming to the nuisance" context is
atypical in that we think the equities may favor the Polluter. In the far more
common circumstance, the equities (and efficiency) favor the Resident, the party
whose property is being impaired. In a footnote, Krier and Schwab discuss the
possibility of (what I have termed) Rule 6, but the authors view this regime as
"an atypical case." They downplay the relevance of Rule 6-not because they
think the equities typically favor polluters-but because they equate the best
chooser with the least numerous party. Because the nuisance of pollution often
comes from a discrete point of origin, but affects multiple neighbors, Krier and
Schwab believe it will be atypical for the neighbors to have a decisional
advantage vis-A-vis exercising the option.
But as argued above,7 6 the option perspective suggests that the best
chooser will turn on more than just numerosity. In particular, because options
are more valuable when there is great uncertainty in the value of the underlying
asset, courts will do well ceterisparibus to give the option to the decision-maker
who has a higher variance of potential values. To see this variance effect,
imagine that a court believes that a Resident's harm from pollution is somewhere
between $5 and $105 (uniformly distributed), but that the Polluter's costs of
stopping pollution are somewhere between $40 and $60 uniformly distributed.
Our first intuition might be to use Rule 2: give the initial entitlement to the
Resident-because she has a higher expected value ($55 v. $50)-and then to
give a call option to the Polluter-to make up for the fact that parties may have
trouble reaching agreement when the Polluter turns out to have the higher value.
But in this example, the Resident's valuation has both a higher mean and a
higher variance. Because options are worth more when the underlying
entitlement is more variable, it turns out that Rule 6-giving the Resident the
entitlement plus a put-is much more efficient than Rule 2.

75. Carol Rose has suggested to me that equities do not necessarily favor the Polluter when the
Residents come to the nuisance. The "coming to the nuisance" rule-not forcing established
Polluters to compensate Residents-is prescription without adversity and without a statutory period.
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Table 5. Expected Payoffs Under Different Rules Giving Initial Entitlement to
Resident
Expected Payoffs (Ex Ante)
Resident

Polluter

Joint

$55

$0

$55

Rule 2
(damages = $55) 1

$55

$.625

$55.625

Rule 6
(damages = $50) 1

$65.125

$0

$65.125

Rule 1

Table 5 shows how the variance effect can cause Rule 6 to dominate Rule 2.
Under Rules 2 and 6, the most efficient exercise prices are $55 and $50
respectively (because these damage amounts cause the taker to take only when
its value is greater than the average valuation of the takee). In equilibrium,
Rule 2 causes the Polluter to exercise her call option 25 % of the time (when her
valuation exceeds $55). The Polluter's expected payoff is just $.625-because
the Polluter rarely exercises its option, and when it does, the Polluter's average
value ($57.50) is only slightly above the damages that it must pay ($55).77
Rule 2 does not help overcome the autarkic inefficiency of Rule 1 very much,
because when the Polluter takes its average valuation it is not much greater than
the Resident's average valuation.
In contrast, Rule 6 causes the Resident to exercise her put option 45 % of
the time (when her valuation is less than $50). As before in Table 4, the put
option fixes the Polluter's expected payoff at $0." But, giving the Resident
the option to sell more substantially overcomes the autarkic inefficiency of Rule
1. Under Rule 6, the Resident's expected payoff is $65.125: 45% of the time,
the Resident will put its entitlement to the Polluter for $50; and the other 55 %
of the time the Resident will keep the entitlement (when it has an average
valuation of $77.50).79
In terms of overall efficiency, when the Resident exercises its Rule 6
option, it causes the entitlement to be transferred from Residents with an
average valuation of $27.50 to Polluters with an average valuation of $50-and
this $22.50 improvement in efficiency happens 45% of the time. In contrast,

77. .625 = .25(57.5 - 55).
78. 0 = .45(0) + .55(0). Fifty-five percent of the time, the Resident enjoins pollution so the
Polluter has a zero payoff, and 44% of the time, the Resident forces the Polluter to pay $50 for
something that it values at $50.
79. 65.125 = .45(50) + .55(77.5).
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when the Polluter exercises its Rule 2 option, it causes the entitlement to be
transferred from Residents with an average valuation of $55 to Polluters with an
average valuation of $57.50-and this meager $2.50 improvement happens only
25% of the time. The high variance Resident is the better chooser, because
harnessing her private information can have a bigger impact on social value.
Rule 2 increases the joint payoffs only about 1% above Rule 1, while Rule 6
represents more than an 18% improvement in efficiency.
Under these
circumstances, an efficiency-minded court would make a substantial error if it
chose Rule 2 over Rule 6.
While numerosity will often militate against giving the option to multiple
residents," the variance effect will often militate in favor of giving the option
to residents. It is often easier for courts to measure the economic costs of
abating or discontinuing pollution than it is for courts to assess the non-economic
damages of pollution to surrounding residents. Even though multiple residents
will often have high costs of collective decision-making, they will also often
have more relevant private information available (knowing how much pollution
really harms them).81
At times, it will be better for courts to deal with the collective action
problems caused by giving multiple residents a put, rather than disregarding
their private information and giving a call option to the Polluter. For example,
I believe that the residents in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement' might have been the
better
chooser
than
the
polluter-notwithstanding
their relative
numerosity-because the court had a more difficult time estimating the value of
the entitlement to the residents. Instead of granting Rule 2 relief, the court
would have been well advised to at least consider Rule 6: give Boomer and his
fellow residents the right to enjoin Atlantic Cement's pollution or the right to
force Atlantic Cement to pay permanent damages.

80. It is important to emphasize that a nuisance need not always affect multiple residents. See,
e.g., Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977) (pollution from
ConEd plant disrupted adjacent new car preparation business); Estancias Dallas Corp v. Schultz, 500
S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App. 1973) (air conditioner noise reduced value of single adjacent residence).
The class of cases dealing with visual nuisances is particularly likely to involve a single plaintiff and
a single defendant. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (hotel addition obstructed view of adjacent hotel); Amphitheaters, Inc.
v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Or. 1948) (light from night-time dog track races interfered
with adjacent drive-in movie).
81. In addition, residents will often be more risk averse than the polluters (who may have
greater abilities to diversify loss) and hence will, other things being equal, tend to be the better
choosers. See supra text accompanying note 60.
82. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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Because there were multiple residents, the court would need to determine
a way to aggregate the residents' preferences about whether to exercise the put.
This is not an easy task. For example, the court might give the residents a put
that would be exercised only if a particular super-majority of residents consented
to selling their no-pollution right. Collective voting schemes of course are
imperfect mechanisms of aggregating preferences-being subject to the voters'
strategic behavior.Y But in the takeover and bankruptcy contexts, the law
(often with the aid of private contract) takes on similar collective action
problems to determine what proportion of entitlement holders have to consent
before a tender offer or a cram down reorganization is consummated.8 Even
super-majority votes raise the possibility that some dissenting residents will be
undercompensated, but this risk of undercompensation will often be less with a
super-majority version of Rule 6 than with a unitary polluter decision under Rule
2. Better to have fellow residents decide whether court awarded damages are
sufficient than the polluter itself. Indeed, a supra-majority exercise trigger
might even be useful in Boomer-like contexts to restrain the residents from
opting for an injunction merely to holdup Boomer for a supra-compensatory
payoff.Y
Additionally, courts could rely the Rule 23 prophylactics of class
certification' to help assure that individual resident interests are adequately
represented in making litigation decisions, including what amounts to a
traditional election of remedies, the decision on whether to elect injunctive or
damage relief. The heightened duties of lawyers representing certified classes,
the typicality requirement for class representatives, and the judicial overview of
the class action litigation are all designed to overcome problems of collective
action.

83. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).

84. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuck, Toward UndistortedChoice and Equal Treatmentin Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1719-20 (1985).
85. In the takeover context, allowing less than unanimous consent to tender offers mitigates the
problem of shareholder holdout. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, RelationalInvesting and Agency
Theory, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1033 (1994); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids,
the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). The
possibility that plaintiffs who are offered even supra-compensatory damages might still prefer opting
for an injunction (which might induce the defendant to pay an even higher amount to avoid shutting
down the plant) has led me to consider having courts issue "inalienable injunctions." See Ayres &
Madison, supra note 69. Under this regime, a plaintiff/resident would still be given the put option
of stopping the pollution or receiving damages, but the injunction to stop pollution would be
"inalienable" in the sense that the court would not allow the defendant to subsequently buy its way
out of the injunctive duties. Giving the plaintiff this type of an inalienable put substantially reduces
the plaintiff's incentive to seek inefficient injunctions merely to increase its bargaining power.
86. See Douglas M. Towns, Merit-basedClass Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle,
78 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1992).
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Many scholars view the numerosity problem as a trump card, suggesting
that it creates an insurmountable barrier that precludes meaningful resident
choice. But while multiple residents, all else being equal, certainly militates
against the use of Rule 6, the foregoing analysis suggests that all else need not
be equal. When the residents' value of no pollution is more speculative than the
factory's value of pollution and/or when residents are more risk averse, a flawed
resident choice under Rule 6 might be more equitable and efficient than a
"perfect" Polluter choice under Rule 2. For those readers who still think that
put options theory has little practical payoff, my answer is to rethink Boomer.
Put option theory suggests that the judge might have been better advised to use
a majority-vote version of Rule 6. This alternative holding would have
furthered the equities of insuring that the residents were not undercompensated
while, at the same time harnessing the more speculative, private information.
B. Facilitating v. Deterring the Initial Taking
But in applying the foregoing discussion to nuisance, there is an important
difference between the puts discussed in Section I and those discussed in Section
II that needs to be more explicitly analyzed. The put theory discussed in Section
I begins by envisioning two parties locked in a bilateral monopoly conflict. Put
option rules-like call option rules-are established by the court to facilitate
efficient transfers when, because of high transaction costs, the parties cannot
privately contract. In Section I, the first and only relevant choice is whether a
put holder will exercise her put.
In Section II, however, the common law examples of put option regimes
are more complicated. The temporary taking (or impairment) of someone else's
right has the effect of giving the initial entitlement holder a put. 7 In the
language of contract, by taking initially, the encroacher makes what amounts to
a "firm" offer to buy. After an initial taking, the initial entitlement holder-like
an offeree receiving a firm offer-has an option to sell, an option to force a
purchase-even if the offeror no longer wants to buy. Instead of beginning the
analysis with the put option, the common law examples begin with the taker's
decision whether to take the initial entitlement. Thus, even though the common
law put examples are analogous to Rule 6 regimes, the common law puts are the
second stage of two reciprocal options.
Jack Balkin and I have previously presented a theory of reciprocal taking
auctions. 8 We examined a situation where a Polluter might have an option to
take initially by paying say $50, but that a Resident would then have a right to

87. In the language of finance, the initial taker has the option of putting a put.
88. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 6, at 707.
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retake by paying (the Polluter) $75. This is an example of reciprocal call
options: the Polluter has an option to buy, followed by the Resident's option to
buy back. But because of what finance economists call "put-call parity,"9 any
put regime can be recharacterized as a type of call option. The put option
examples of Section II can accordingly be recharacterized as a special kind of
second-order call options. A two-stage version of Rule 6 applied to the nuisance
context is equivalent to an award giving the Polluter an option to take initially
by paying D dollars, but then giving the Resident the option to take back the
entitlement for D dollars. Such a Rule 6 award is just a constrained version of
the second-order liability rules analyzed in Ayres and Balkin, in that the exercise
prices of the first- and second-order options are constrained to equal the same
amount. 9o
Appreciating that put options are often the second stage of a two-step
process has important implications for thinking about how a court should set
damages. By setting damages, the court not only will affect whether the
(second-stage) put option is exercised, but also whether (in the first stage) the
other side takes the initial action that gives rise to the put option coming into
existence. Saul Levmore realized just this point in analyzing the effects of Rule
5. Remember that Rule 5 gives the entitlement to pollute, plus a put option, to
the Polluter (and that under Krier and Schwab's theory the exercise price for the
put option should equal the amount the court thinks the Resident would be
damaged by pollution). 91 Levmore argued: "If a judge follows Krier-Schwab
and allows the defendant [Polluter] to continue on as before or instead choose
to stop but then collect [the Resident's] (projected but not yet suffered) damages,
[the Resident] may well be sorry that she brought her complaint."' Levmore
saw that giving the Polluter the second-stage option of collecting $100,000 for
stopping pollution could deter the Resident's first-stage choice of bringing suit.
Under this version of Rule 5, the Polluter's put option only emerges if the
Resident files an initial complaint.

89. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 6, at 557 (defining put-call parity); Ayres & Talley,
supra note 6, at 1047 (applying put-call parity to liability rules).
90. As a general matter, the unconstrained second-order option regimes will produce higher
joint payoffs than the constrained second-order option regimes discussed in this article. To decouple
the first- and second-order exercise prices, it would be necessary for a court to give the Resident the
option of (a) being paid $50 for permanently ceding to the Polluter the right to pollute or (b)paying
$25 to gain an injunction to permanently stop pollution. Ellickson proposed just such a scheme for
resolving nuisance disputes in his seminal 1973 article. See Ellickson, supra note 4, at 748.
91. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 472 ("[tlhe judge calculates, exactly as the judge
would in a rule two case, the Rs = damages if P stays").
92. Levmore, supra note 6, at 2166-67.
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While this first-stage deterrence effect is perverse in Rule 5, it has a much
more positive effect in the Rule 6 context. Under Rule 6, the second-stage put
option is triggered by a first-stage taking. If Guido converts my watch to his
possession, my common law put option of forcing Guido to pay me the
permanent value of the watch may deter Guido from taking it in the first place.
Or, in the nuisance context, Rule 6 might deter a Polluter from polluting to
begin with. Under Rule 5, a Resident might regret bringing suit. Under Rule
6, the analogous regret is a potential benefit: the Polluter may regret having
polluted. Indeed, the genius of Rule 6 is that it can simultaneously deter initial
takings and provide a safety net for occasions where the deterrence fails. If a
taking happens by mistake, or because the deterrence fails, the put option can
help make sure that the entitlement still flows to the higher-valuing user. Under
Rule 6, setting damages at the taker's expected value will cause the initial
entitlement holder to put the entitlement when, on average, it has a lower value.
Thus, in the nuisance context, setting the Rule 6 damages equal to the Polluter's
expected value of polluting can simultaneously deter Polluters from polluting,
and, if pollution nonetheless occurs, it can help to assure that the higher valuer
controls the pollution entitlement.
Thus, we can see two starkly different uses of put options. As described
in Section I, put options, like traditional liability rules, can be used to facilitate
the transfer of an entitlement when high transaction costs preclude traditional
trade. But as described in Section II, put options can also be used as an
additional means to implement property-rule protection of an initial
entitlement-that is, to deter the non-consensual transfer of an entitlement. The
crucial difference between deterring and facilitating puts is the size of damages,
or in option terminology, the exercise price. A put exercise price set at the
taker's expected value will tend to deter initial takings,' while a put exercise
price that is set lower-for example, at the court's estimate of what the parties
would have contracted for if bargaining were possible-is likely to induce
intentional taking. In the nuisance context, a "deterring" Rule 6 would set the
potential damages equal to the Polluter's benefit from being able to continue
polluting, while a "facilitating" Rule 6 would set a smaller damages amount
equal to the amount that Polluter would have negotiated to pay the Resident for
the right to pollute.
To get a handle on which type of put option regime is more appropriate,
it is useful to consider the two dichotomies depicted in the following table.

93. However, even under this deterrence standard, potential takers with unexpected and
undetectable high valuations may still be motivated to take in the shadow of such damages.
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Table 6. Factors Militating Toward Whether Put Options Should Deter or
Facilitate Initial Taking

Transaction Costs

Initial

High

Low

Deliberate

Facilitate

Deter? 94

Mistaken

Deter

Deter

Taking

Table 6 focuses on the initial taker's mens rea (that is, whether the initial taking
is deliberate or mistaken) and upon whether consensual trade is possible (that is,
whether transaction costs are high or low).
When transaction costs are low, traditional theory suggests that we should
set a "deterring" exercise price. Deterring non-consensual takings will tend to
channel parties toward consensual transactions. 95 Setting the Rule 6 damages
to equal the judge's best estimate of the Polluter's valuation will not deter all
takings, because Polluters with unexpectedly large valuations will still have an
incentive to pollute. Richard Epstein has criticized awarding puts for mistaken
takings,' but setting the put's exercise price equal to the mistaken-maker's
valuation will normally result in such low damages that the initial entitlement
holder will not exercise the put, but instead will seek injunctive relief.
When high transaction costs preclude consensual trade, the put exercise
price should be set to induce the efficient amount of non-consensual transfer.
When the initial taking is non-deliberate, the court should focus solely on what
exercise price will induce the aggrieved entitlement holder to put efficiently.

94. For a discussion of the question mark, see infra note 95.
95. But Eric Talley and I have pointed out that when transaction costs are low, parties may also
contract efficiently in the shadow of liability rules or other option regimes that tend to facilitate nonconsensual takings. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1058; Ayres & Talley, supra note 33, at
238. If liability and property-rules regimes are equivalent when transaction costs are zero, there is
no reason to think that property rules should suddenly dominate when the cost of transacting rises
slightly.
96. See supra note 64.
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The "deterring" exercise price achieves this end. Under Rule 6, setting the
damages equal to the Polluter's expected value of pollution will cause the
Resident to put its no-pollution entitlement only when it values the entitlement
less, on average, then the Polluter. This is simply a put application of KaplowShavell's proof that the optimal option exercise price should be set at the court's
estimate of how much the non-option holder values the entitlement (and KrierSchwab's analysis of Rule 5 is in accord).97
The problem with the "deterring" Rule 6 exercise price in high transaction
cost settings is that it may deter too many high-value Polluters from polluting
initially and, thereby, triggering the Residents' put option. Under Rule 6, the
"deterring" exercise price regime will cause the Polluter to either stop polluting
or disgorge any expected benefit of polluting.
While Polluter's with
unexpectedly high values may nonetheless begin to pollute, a more efficient
regime would encourage more initial takings. When transaction costs are high,
efficiency-minded lawmakers will want to encourage a range of deliberate
takings. This, of course, is the lesson of Boomer where the court allowed a
Polluter to take the Resident's pollution right if the Polluter was willing to pay
damages (which were substantially below the Polluter's value of polluting).9
But under Rule 6, the exercise price needs to tradeoff two different
constraints to facilitate efficient non-consensual transfer:
the Polluter's
reluctance to pollute initially, and the Resident's reluctance to put its initial
entitlement. When the initial taking is a deliberate act by the Polluter, Rule 6
creates a joint veto system where either party can stop the non-consensual
transfer of the entitlement from the Resident to the Polluter. A "deterring"
exercise price causes the Resident to efficiently put its entitlement (conditional
on the Polluter's initial pollution), but also causes an inefficiently small amount
of initial pollution. In the deliberate taking context, the optimal Rule 6 damages
will be less than the "deterring" damages (set to equal the Polluter's value of
pollution) and, instead, will approximately split the difference between the
Resident's and the Polluter's mean valuations." Readers who think there is no
earthly reason why the court should facilitate intentional takings of other
people's property should remember that this is just the effect of the Boomer
decision itself. Indeed, we are likely to have more intentional pollution under
Rule 2 (with damages set at the Resident's expected value) than under Rule 6
(with facilitating damages set closer to the mean of the plaintiff's and
defendant's mean valuation).

97. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 35, at 725; Krier & Schwab, supra note 4, at 472.
98. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
99. Paul Goldbart and I are currently analyzing how courts should set optimal "facilitating"
damages in a formal model.
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Thus, in Boomer, where the court estimated that the "total of permanent
damages to all plaintiffs . . . was $185,000" but that enjoining the pollution
might impose a cost on Atlantic Cement Co. closer to $45 million, the deterring
exercise price (of $45 million) would be substantially in excess of a facilitating
exercise price (at least half this amount). Instead of giving Atlantic Cement a
Rule 2 call option to pollute if it paid the Resident's value, it would be both
more equitable and efficient to give the residents an option to gain an injunction
against pollution or an option to receive, say, $10 or $20 million as
compensation for ceding a limited pollution right to Atlantic Cement. 1°
C. Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights'0 '
The scope of a property owner's right to be unencumbered by nuisance is
muddier than a property owner's right to be unencumbered by trespass or
conversion. As Tom Merrill pointed out:
Intentional intrusions subject to the rule of trespass are governed
by a standard of care which is "exceptionally simple and exceptionally
rigorous." In order to establish an actionable trespass, all that A need
show is that B is responsible for an invasion of the column of space
that defines A's possessory interest under the ad coelum rule. No
weighing or balancing of costs and benefits is involved ...
Intentional harms subject to the law of nuisance, in contrast, are
governed by a standard of care that is neither so simple nor so
rigorous. . . . A will have to show . . . that the harm to A and
similarly situated neighbors is greater than the benefits that accrue to
B and society generally from increased production and employment at
the factory."

100. The stylized facts of Boomer differ from the economic models of Section I (see also supra
text accompanying note 74) because in Boomer there seems to have been little doubt that the
plaintiffs' value was lower than the defendant's. Under such circumstances, there are a wide range
of exercise prices-to wit any amount higher than the plaintiffs' highest possible valuation and lower
than the defendant's lowest possible valuation-that will induce efficient ex post allocation of the
entitlement (assuming still that bargaining is not possible). Within this range, the court has
flexibility to do equity or promote ex ante investment incentives. It is only when the probability
distributions of the litigants' valuation overlap-in the sense that there is some chance that
defendants' valuation could be above or below the plaintiffs' valuation-that the court's choice of
a more precise exercise price will affect ex post allocative efficience.
101. This section's title is taken from Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs
of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
102. Merrill, supra note 102, at 16-18.
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The law of nuisance is much more of a cost-benefit "standard"-tuming on ex
post judicial balancing-in comparison to the bright-line "rule" of trespass.
The examples of puts in the common law discussed in Section II are-like
trespass rules-all triggered by clear invasion of plaintiffs' entitlements. When
Rose steals my watch or builds an encroaching wall or becomes a holdover
tenant, Rose usually knows at the time that she is unlawfully impairing my
entitlement. In contrast, it is more difficult for Rose to know in advance
whether her noise or dust emission will constitute a nuisance."13
It is
reasonable to ask whether this "rule vs. standard" contrast might explain when
the common law grants plaintiffs puts. In particular, there is a policy reason for
granting remedial puts only when there are relatively bright-lined rules for what
constitutes a taking. Rose qua Polluter may be less blameworthy because it is
less clear when she acts that her emissions will subsequently be held to
constitute a nuisance. Because of this uncertainty, it is reasonable to conclude
that at least some polluters are acting with less intent. As an equitable matter,
it is easier to justify giving the plaintiff a put option when the defendant has
intentionally impaired the plaintiff's entitlement. The relative intentionality of
the defendants' taking, however, cannot explain the common law's absolute
refusal to grant plaintiffs a remedial put. First, some emissions are sufficiently
noxious that defendants are constructively on notice that they will constitute a
nuisance. Courts do not award plaintiffs remedial puts even when defendants
intentionally create a nuisance. Second, courts give plaintiffs puts for even
unintentional conversion. Finally, as argued above,"" even when the taking
is unintentional, giving plaintiffs puts may give defendants appropriate incentives
to avoid negligent takings.
A second and related potential ground for distinguishing nuisance from the
common law puts in Section II concerns transaction costs. The common law
tends to give puts in settings where the transaction costs are relatively low. It

103. The difficulty of identifying who owns what entitlements is part of what Carol Rose has
usefully characterized as a "Type I" transaction cost to distinguish it from the difficulties of coming
to terms once the bargainers and the subject matter have been identified (which Rose labels "Type
11" transaction costs). See Rose, supra note 6, at 2189. Rose is right that not knowing who to
bargain with is an important special species of transaction cost. But not knowing how much you
own relative to another identified bargainer is not necessarily a transaction cost at all. Uncertainty
about the relative legal rights and duties of two identified people can be thought of as a probabilistic
division of the entitlement that can facilitate trade. Ayres & Talley, supra note 6, at 1027; Jason
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995).
Puts may also be more useful than calls in overcoming the "Type I" transaction cost problem
of not knowing who to bargain with. Although the government could legally exercise its eminent
domain call option to buy, say automatic rifles from the public, a major obstacle to such a policy
is finding out who owns the firearms. Buy-back programs that give the owners puts may be more
successful. See supra note 47.
104. See supra note 64.
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is easier for the potential taker to bargain for a new watch than to bargain for
the right to pollute."
Courts might be more inclined as matter of equity to
give plaintiffs a remedial put when defendant had an opportunity to buy the good
on the open market but instead converted it. Under this theory, even a
defendant's intentional takings may not warrant granting plaintiffs a remedial put
if the defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to bargain.
While this market avoidance theory is attractive, it does not provide a
strong equitable basis for a court to favor giving the defendant a call (Rule 2)
over giving the plaintiff a put. The plaintiff after all also does not have access
to a market for the nuisance right in question. And by reducing the exercise
price of the put (a la the "facilitating" approached discussed above), the court
can still let allow the polluter to retain substantial benefits from polluting. When
transaction costs are high, either puts or call help overcome the holdout
problem. But the transaction costs themselves (or the degree of intentionality)
provides little reason for letting the defendant instead of the plaintiff decide
whether payment will be made."0
CONCLUSION

In a recent symposium honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of One View
of the Cathedral, it was pointed out that James Atwood had discussed the
possibility of a Rule 4 in a Stanford Law Review Note published three years
before Calabresi and Melamed's analysis."o
This revelation-graciously

105. Bargaining for nuisance rights may be difficult because of numerosity and because
nuisance trading is more likely to involve geographically a bilateral monopoly. As argued supra
note 103, however, I believe it is mistaken to view the uncertainty over relative claims of the two
parties as a transaction cost. Merrill has powerfully argued that the rules for determining what
constitutes a nuisance are more standard-like because the costs of transacting are apt to be high.
Merrill, supra note 102, at 13.
106. The uncertainty over what constitutes a nuisance is caused in part because courts often ask
whether "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979). The plaintiff often has private information about the harm and
the defendant often has private information about the benefits. Johnston, supra note 104. The
parties' valuation thus may affect not only the exercise price of put and call regimes but also affect
whether the emissions are considered sufficiently severe to constitute an actionable nuisance. As
Levmore has noted, having multiple legal consequences attend the litigants' report of value may
create a "countervailing" effect that may, for example, discourage defendants from overstating the
costs of an injunction. Levmore, supra note 6, at 2170. Stating a high factory value decreases the
chance under the Restatement balancing test that the court will find the pollution to be a nuisance,
but simultaneously increases the damages that the defendant would have to pay if a Rule 6 put is
awarded to plaintiff (under either the deterring or facilitating approaches discussed above).
107. See James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 293, 315 (1969).
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acknowledged by Judge Calabresi "-highlights the difficulties of making
claims of originality. Indeed, a major part of this Article is to suggest that,
while put option regimes seem new and "startling" to the small cadre of scholars
who have been writing in parallel on the subject, put options have been
embedded in the common law for a long time without us noticing. Until now,
most puts have been used to further the twin goals of deterring initial takings
and, when deterrence fails, channeling the taken goods to the higher valuer. But
we have suggested theoretical reasons why put option regimes with lower
damages (i.e., exercise prices) might also play a valuable role in encouraging
value-enhancing takings. Instead of giving Atlantic Cement the option of
polluting and paying residents the damages of pollution, courts should consider
giving residents the option of stopping the pollution or (if a majority or supermajority so votes) the option of ceding their "no pollution" entitlement in return
for receiving an amount that the parties would have been willing to contract for
(if transaction costs had not prevented consensual trade).1
It is perverse that
Richard Epstein should be so against "put options" as a way to mitigate bilateral
monopoly problems. Rule 6 shows that option regimes need not be part of a
vast left-wing conspiracy to undermine property rights. Put options can shore
up the property rights of the initial entitlement holder. Put options can deter
takings, eliminate the risk that initial owners will be undercompensated, and,
when takings do occur, help overcome the bilateral holdup problem. We could
do a lot worse.

108. Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201,
2204 (1997).
109. In future work, I plan to argue that Atlantic Cement should be given the option to increase
the potential damages that it would pay to help ensure that residents do not opt for injunctive relief
merely as a bargaining ploy to extract more money from the Polluter. See Ayres & Madison, supra
note 69.
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